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MALMGREN

v.

MOCOLGAN

[20 C. (2d)

June 1942]

;

HARRIET C. MALMGREN, Respondent, V. CHARLES J.
MoCOLGAN, as Franchise Tax Commissioner, etc.,
Appellant.

'[4] ld. - Income Taxes - Taxable Year. - Under the Personal
Income Tax Act, the taxable year represents an accounting
period of twelve months. It is not reduced to a shorter period
by the circumstance that a taxpayer undergoes a change, in
[3J See 27 Am. Jur. 357.
!lcK. Dig. Reference: [1-7] Taxation, § 458.
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Notwithstanding Personal Income Tax Act, § 7 (b) (3) declaring to be exempt the value of 'property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise, or inheritance, a legatee who inherits the'right;
to receive income may be taxed on the incoine. ' The estate'
bears the burden of the tax when it' holds the income, and;
transfers that burden to the legatee when it distributes the.
income.
[7] ld.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-Taxation to Legatees.-,
To authorize, the taxation of a legatee on income, it is not
necessary that he be entitled to have it paid to him at the'
time the estate receives it. While under Personal Income Tax
Act, § 12 (d) (2)" currently distributable income is taxable to
the beneficiary, it does not follow that only such income is
taxable to him.

[1] Taxation-Income Taxes-Esta.te Income.-As a general rule,
the net income of an estate is taxable to beneficiaries only if
it is distributed or distributable to them in the taxable year
received by the estate.

[3a, 3b] Id.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-Taxation to Legatees.
-Under the Personal Income Tax Act, § 12 (d) (3), income of
an estate is taxable to the legatees where the estate is on a
calendar year basis, where the income is received during
administration and settlement of the estate, and is income of
the estate for its taxable year, where the distribution of the
estate is made during such year and at the same time as the
allowance of the final account and discharge of the executor.
The statute refers to all income received during administration and properly paid during the taxable year of the estate.
Even if the administration is assumed to terminate before the
final distribution, the estate's taxable year runs until the end
of the twelve months' accounting period.

MCCOLGAN

[6] Id.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-TaxatioD to Legatees.-

DAISY F. CASWELL, Respondent, V. CHARLES J.
MoCOLGAN, as Franchlse Tax Commissioner, etc.;
Appellant.

I!

v.

[20 O. (2d) f24]

status or ceases to exist, or that the income reported is for
less than a twelve months' p~riod.
[5] ld.-Income TaxeS-:Estate Income-Distribution with Corpus.,
-Income of an estate retains its character as such whether
it is distributed separately from or with the corpUs of the
estate:
'

[So F. No. 16365. In Bank. June 9, 1942.]

[2] Id.-Income Taxes-Estate Income-Taxation to Legatees.Under the Personal Income Tax Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1090,
Stats. 1937, p. 1844, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8494),
§ 12 (d) (3) makes four specifications governing deductibility
of income by the estate and its taxability to the legatees:
(1) The income must be received during the administration
of the estate; (2) it must be income of the estate for its taxable year; (3) it must be paid or credited to the legatees
properly, and (4) during that taxable year.

MALMGREN

,~

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. I. M. Golden, Judge.
Reversed.
Two actions for refund of income taxes paid under protest.
Judgments for plaintiffs on the pleadings reversed.
Earl Warren, Attorney General, H. H. Linney, James J.
Arditto, and Valentine Brookes, Thlputies Attorney General,
for Appellant.
.
Joseph C. Meyerstein for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-George W. Caswell,. a resident of San.
Francisco, died testate on August 22, 1935. His will directed
the payrilent of certain specific bequests, confirmed the Ijght
of his wife to one half of the community property and left
the balance of the estate to his daughter, Harriet C. Malmgren. Under the decree of final distribution, entered by the .
court on November 3,1937, the payment of debts and charges,
family allowance and legacies, was approved and the residue
was distributed, one half to testator's daughter and one half
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to his wife.
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The executrix made a return pursuant. to the
California Personal Income Tax Act (Stats. 1935,p. 1090;
amended by Stats. 1937, p. 1831; Stats. 1939, p. 2528; Stats.
194i, pp. 471, 2121, 3220; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8494) on
behalf of the estate for. each year of its administration. In
1937 she paid from the income account, estate and inheritance
taxes, which are non-deductible under section 8 (c) of the act.
She made a return setting forth all income received by
the estate in 1937 and paid the tax computed on the full
amount thereof withont. deduction. The commissioner returned the tax to the executrix and assessed a tax to testator's
wife on one half the income and to testator's daughter on the
other half. The taxes so assessed were paid under protest.
The trial court overruled appellant's demurrers and granted
respondent's motions for judgments on the pleadings. From:
these judgments this appeal was taken pursuant to a stipulationfor consolidation.
[1]· Respondents concede that the account from which the
estate made the distribution does not establish its character
as a payment of corpus or income. (Burnet v. Whitehouse,
283 U. S. 148 [51 S. Ct. 374, 75 L. Ed. 916]; Helvering v.
Butterworthl 290 U.S. 365 [54 S. Ct. 221, 78 L.Ed. 365] ;
Letts v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 84 F. (2d) 760, 762;,
Sitterding v. CommisMoner of Ht; Rev., 80 F. (2d) 939.) It
is clear also that the failure of the estate to deduct the income
as a distribution· to ~egatees does not free the legatees of tax
thereon, if thedistrijJHtion is a proper payment of income,
to them. (Riker v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 42 F. (2d)
150; Little v. White, 47 F. (2d) 512;) Each year the net
income of an estate becomes subject toa tax against either
the estate or the beneficiaries. As a general rule it is taxable
to the beneficiaries only if it is distributed or distributable
to them in the taxabl,e year received by the estat.e.. Thecommissioner cannot, and did not attempt to tax to respondents
incom~ received by and taxed to the estate in a year prior
to 1937. (Oommissionerof Int. Rev. v. Owens, 78 F. (2d)
768; Haag, 19 B.T. A. 982; Ball, 27 B. T. A. 388.) Thesole
question on these appeals! therefore, is whether tinder the
California Personal Income Tax Act as amended in 1937, the
income admittedly received, by the estate in 193,7 is taxable
to the estate or to the wife and daughter.
Everything· in the estate was distributed, including' the
1937 income. The commissioner .contends that this income
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is taxable to the wife and daughter un.der paragr~ph (3) o~
section 12 (d) of the act providing:" In the case ()f inco1ll6
received by estates of deceased personsdurlng the period p£
administration or settlement of the estate, and in the cMe o~
income which, in the discretion. of, the fiduciary, may', be
either distributed' to the beneficiary or accumulated, ther~
shall. be allowlld as an additional deduction in computing the
net income. of '. the estate or trust the amount of the. inqonie
of the estate or trust for its taxable year,~hich is properly
paid or ,credited during such year to any' legatee, heir, or,
beneficiary, but the. amount so allowed as a deduction shall
be included in computing the net income of the legatee, heir
or beneficiary."
.
.,'
[2] The foregoing provision makes four speclfications
governing deductibility of the income by the estate and its
taxability to the legatees: (1) The income must be received,
during the administration of the estate; (2) it must be income
of the estate for its taxable year ;(3). it mu.st be paid'
credited to the legatees properly, and (4) du.ring that taxable
year.
[3a] The income in question meets these. specifications.
.;. (1) It was received by the estate in 1937 during the administration and settlement of the estate. (2) The estate was on
. a calendar year basis and the income it receivedbetweeIl
January 1, 1937 and December 31, 1937, was income'
the
estate for that taxable year. (3) The approval of the probate,
court leaves. no question that. the distribution was properly
made. (Freuler v. Helvering; 291 U. S. 35 [54 S.Ot. 308,
78L. Ed. 634].) (4) Respondent concedes that th~.1ast tax~
able year of the estate' was ihe entire calendar. year 1937.
The distribution of November 3, 1937, was theref()re made
during that taxable year even tb.ou.gh. the final account wa~
allowed and the executrix or,dered discharged at .the. same
time. [4] The taxable year represents Itnaccounting"perlod
of twelve months. It is not reduced to a shorter period,by
the circumstance that' a taxpayer undergoes a· chan.ge 'm
status or ceases to exist or that the income reported isfot
less than a twelve .months' period. (Bankers Trustao. v.
Bowers, 295 F. 89 [31 A. L. R. 922]; Strong I1ewai& ao.V:.
U. S., 62 Ct. Cls. 67; Louis Hymel Planting &- Mig·. po:, 5
B. T. A. 910; Penn et al. Ex~cutors v. Robertson, 115 F.(2d)
167; Helvering v. Morgan~s Inc., 293, U.s' 121 (5'5 S. ,O't; 60',
79 L. Ed. 232]; Palomai 'tand &; Oattle '00. v. Oommissioner
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of Int. Rev., 91 F. (2d) 100; Oommissioner of Int. Rev. v.
General Machinery Corp., 95 F. (2d) 759.) [3b]. In S. F.
Durkheimer, 41 B. T. A.585, on which respondents rely, the
board of tax appeals held the iJ{come taxable to the estate
and not to the residuary legatee on the theory that the final
distribution was not made before the completion of the administration of the estate. The board interpreted subdivision (c)
of section 162 of the federal act, which corresponds to paragraph (3) of section 12 (d) of the state act, as having reference "only to· cases where the income has been paid or properly credited to the legatee during the period of administration or settlement." This interpretation is erroneous. The
statute refers to all income received during administration
and properly paid during the taxable year of. the estate.
Even if the administration were assumed to terminate before
the final distribution, the estate's taxable year runs until the
end of the twelve months' accounting period. Income properly paid during that period that was received during the
administration of the estate is deductible by the estate and
taxable to the legatee under the plain language of the statute.
[5] There remains the question whether the income
retained its character as income when it was distributed to
the legatees as part of the total assets. Income of an estate
is clearly income to the legatees when distributed separately
from the corpus of the estate. When it is distributed along
with the corpus nothing occurs to alter its character. In
either case it is merely transferred, not transformed. Before
its distribution it is identified as income even though it is
allied with the corpus as a constituent of the entire estate.
it does not lose its identity after distribution to the legatees
for whose benefit it has been held when it is allied with the
corpus in distribution. The right of a legatee to the corpus
vests at the death of the testator and" residuary legatees who
receive payments of funds composed both of original assets
of the estate and of estate income, receive that portion represented by estate income as income derived from their own
property." (Weigel v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 96 F.
(2d) 387, 389.) In Weber v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 111
F. (2d) 766, profit from the sale of a farm devised to residuary legatees, with a power of sale conferred on the executors,
was distributed to them as part of the proceeds, and was held
properly paid to them and deductible by the estate under
section 162 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1932, corresponding

,.

1

MALMGREN V.MCCOLGAN

429

[20 C.(2d) 4241

with paragraph (3) of section 12 (d) of the state act. The
court declared: ' , We cannot grasp the commissioner's argument that the profit on the sale 'was never payable to them
as such but was paid to them in discharge of their lega,cies.'
The profit was payable to them as profit, because it Was part
of· the proceeds of sale of the farm. See. Commissioner of
Int. Rev. v. Stearns, 2 Cir. 65 F. (2d) 371. On the assump;,
tion that it was the estate which realized tlieprofit the ,case
is squarely within section 162 (c)." (See contra, Estate of
Anderson v. Oommissioner of Int. Rev., 126 F. (2d) 46,;
cf. Oounty NationalBank &7 Trust 00. v. Helvering, 122 P.
(2d) 29.)
[6] Respondents contend, however, that the. entire distribution constitutes a legacy no part of which can be regarded
as income, and is therefore exempt under section 7; (b) (3) of
the act providing: "The following items shall not be included
in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under
this act: . . . (3) The value of property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise, or inheritance (but the income from such
property shall be included in gross income)."
This contention is answered by the decision in Irwin v•.
Gavit, 268 U. S. 161 [45 S. Ct. 475, 69 L. Ed. 897], interpreting an identical provision in the Federal Income Tax Act of
1913 exempting bequests but taxing the income therefrom.
A legatee who inherited the right to receive the income of a
trust for fifteen years was held taxable on that income. The
contention that the inherited income was his bequest yielded
to the holding that all income of the estate arising after the
death of the testator was taxable to someone and that Congress
made ittaxable to the recipient. In imposing the tax upon
the beneficiary the income tax statutes of both the state and
federal government thus distinguish between the estate and
its income irrespective of whether the beneficiary may receive
the income as a legacy. Under paragraph (3) of section.12 (d)
of the state act, as in the corresponding federal provisions,
the burden of taxation accompanies the income. The estate
bears the burden of the tax when it holds the income, and
transfers that burden to the legatee when it distributes the
income.
[7] Respondents have advanced the theory that a legatee
is not taxable on income' received by an estate unless he is
entitled to have ~t paid to him at the time the estate receives it~
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No such lImitation, however, can be found in either thefed~
eral o.rsta:te acts,no.r couldit be read into. these acts witho.ut
nullifying paragraph (3) of sectibn 12 (d) of the state act
;ail well as section 162 (c) o.f the Internal Revenue Code.
Actually paragraph (3) of section 12 (d) supplements the
,provision in paragraph (2) of that section that currently
distributable income is taxable to. the beneficiary. All income
to which the beneficiary is entitled at the time of its receipt
'by the fiduciary falls into the. categor;r of income to. be distributed currently, envisaged in paragraph (2). It does not
;follow, however, that only such income is taxable to the
beneficiary. The taxability of income to the beneficiary is
not precluded by paragraph (2) simply because the income
does not fall within Its scope. Paragraph (3) designates
income as taxable to the beneficiary precisely because it does
not fall within the scope of paragraph (2). Under paragraph
(3) income that is distributable in the discretion of the fiduciary is deductible when distributed to the beneficiary and
taxable to the latter even though he is not entitled to such
income at the time of its receipt by the fiduciary. Similarly,
the provision in paragraph (3) that income received by an
estate and paid to a legatee is deductible by the estate and
taxable to the legatee makes it clear that such income is not
iimited to that contemplated by paragraph (2).
Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148 [51 S. Ct. 374, 75 L
Ed. 916], Roebling v. Oommissioner of Int. Rev., 78 F. (2d)
444, and Spreckels v. Oommissioner of Int. Rev., 101 F. (2d)
721, on which respondents rely, are concerned with the meaning of currently distributable income in the federal income
tax provisions corresponding to paragraph (2) of section
12 (d). They are not concerned with the pro.visions corresponding to paragraph (3) of that section encompassing the
income of estates jn administration and income that can be
distributed at the discretion of the trustee. In any event the
1937 amendment to paragraph (2) of section 12 (d) renders
the foregoing cases inapplicable even to that paragraph by
providing, " . . . For the purpose of this paragraph amounts
currently distributable to beneficiaries are distributable out
of income of the estate or trust' for the taxable year if there
is inco.me of the estate or trust for the taxable year out o.f
which such distributions may be m~e and if, under the terms
of the will or trust instrument, the distributions may be made
out of such income,' regardless of the fact that the will Or
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trust instrument provides that the distributions mayberitade
out of the Co.rpus o.f the estate or trust •.• " (Stats. 1937,
p.1844.)·
The judgments are reversed.
Gibso.n, C. J." Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmo.nds, J., 'and
Carter, J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was"denied July 6~
1942.

[L. A. No. 18117. In Bank. June 9, 1942.]

FRAIN R. ANDERSON, Respondent, v. MARY M. ANDERSON, Appellant.
.

,

[1] Appeal- Record - Time for Filing - Effect of DelaY. - An

appeal will be dismissed for failure to. file a transcript in time
where a bill of exceptions was settled and the engrossed bill
signed without a hearing having heen set,· notice given or
hearing held to settle the bill,and where appellant, although
served with a copy of the engrossed hili, took no steps to have 1t
corrected or to prevent the trial judge from signing it,or to
set aside the order of settlement, and where the time for filing
the transcript had elapsed.
[2] Id.-Record-Time for Filing-Effect of Delay.--"':Ari 'appeal
will not he dismissed on the ground that a transcript was not
filed in time where the engrossed hill of exceptions was not
signed by the trial judge, and the time for filing th~ tran-'
script had not as a consequence hegun to run.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court o.f Los
Angeles County for partition and from an order confirming
sale of property. ThomasC; Gould, Judge. Appeal fromjudgment dismissed .on motion; motion to dismiss. appeal from order
denied.
. [2] .See2Cal. Jur.. ,653.
:.
..' d, >" ; I;';
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Appeal and Error, § 732.

).; '':';]";

